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ABSTRACT—The Chapter 11 bankruptcy process demands a careful 
balance between protecting the creditors’ rights to be repaid and allowing a 
failing entity the ability to restructure. The Supreme Court in RadLAX 
Gateway Hotel affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding in River Road and 
interpreted the Bankruptcy Code in a way that improperly shifts this 
balance towards the most senior creditors at the expense of business. This 
Note will analyze the circuit disagreement over the cramdown provision in 
the Bankruptcy Code and the Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution. It will 
argue that in light of recent trends in the credit marketsincluding highly 
liquid secondary markets for debt and aggressive lenders looking to 
speculate on restructuring businessesthe Supreme Court’s current 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code supports improper policy. It will also 
argue that consistent interpretation between two provisions in the 
Bankruptcy Code§§ 363 and 1129(b), focusing on balancing the needs of 
debtors to restructure with the rights of creditors to be repaidsuggests 
that the Supreme Court should have interpreted the cramdown provision to 
grant more flexibility in plan design. This Note argues that Congress, in 
light of the RadLAX decision, should amend the Bankruptcy Code to better 
suit the goals of the modern-day bankruptcy. 
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In the fast-paced and high-volume world of bankruptcy, a small 
disagreement in statutory interpretation sealed the fate of billions of dollars 
of investment capital.1 In April 2012, the Supreme Court resolved the split 
between the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits over “[w]hether a debtor 
may pursue a chapter 11 plan that proposes to sell assets free of liens 
without allowing the secured creditor to credit bid, but instead providing it 
with the indubitable equivalent of its claim under Section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code.”2 The Fifth Circuit in Bank of 
New York Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (In re The 
Pacific Lumber Co.) and the Third Circuit in In re Philadelphia 
 
1 Vincent S.J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy Auctions, 
18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 100 (2010) (noting that whether secured creditors are entitled to credit bid 
“likely holds tens of billions of dollars in the balance”). 
2 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. 
Ct. 2065 (2012) (No. 11-166). 
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Newspapers, LLC held that a debtor can confirm an asset sale plan that 
restricts credit bidding under the indubitable equivalent standard of 
subsection (iii),3 while the Seventh Circuit in River Road Hotel Partners v. 
Amalgamated Bank held that a debtor cannot confirm a plan in this 
manner; rather, any plan that proposes to sell assets free and clear of liens 
must presumptively permit credit bidding.4 The Supreme Court affirmed 
the Seventh Circuit’s holding in River Road, renamed RadLAX Gateway 
Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,5 in a brief opinion that unnecessarily 
restricts the cramdown options available to bankruptcy courts and fosters 
the continued use of aggressive lender strategies. 
In re Philadelphia Newspapers and River Road are, above all, cases of 
statutory interpretation.6 They analyzed § 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which permits a debtor to confirm a plan over the opposition of 
secured creditors if: (i) the secured creditors retain their liens on the 
collateral and receive deferred cash payments equal to the present value of 
their secured claim; (ii) subject to the secured creditors’ right to credit bid, 
the debtors sell the collateral “free and clear of such liens” and such liens 
“attach to the proceeds of [the] sale”; or (iii) the plan provides the secured 
creditors with the indubitable equivalent of their claims.7 The Third Circuit 
in In re Philadelphia Newspapers concluded that the three subprovisions of 
§ 1129(b) are disjunctive, and that a plan may be confirmed under any 
subprovision,8 while the Seventh Circuit in River Road concluded that what 
the plan proposes to accomplish governs the subprovision under which it 
must be confirmed.9 
Focusing on the impact of the statutory interpretation will add clarity 
and context to the debate. The Third and Fifth Circuits held that the 
proponent of a plan, typically the debtor, may choose whether to restrict 
credit bidding at an auction sale.10 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, 
enforced a functional classification for the plan: what the plan proposes to 
 
3 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. 
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 246 (5th Cir. 2009). 
Credit bidding is the practice of a creditor bidding at a bankruptcy auction sale of assets in credit up to 
the value of its claim. 
4 651 F.3d 642, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. 
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012).   
5 For the duration of this Note, I will refer to the Seventh Circuit opinion as “River Road” and to 
the Supreme Court opinion as “RadLAX Gateway Hotel” or “RadLAX.” 
6 See River Rd., 651 F.3d at 647; In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 304. 
7 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
8 599 F.3d at 305–06, 310. 
9 651 F.3d at 652. 
10 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301; Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured 
Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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do governs how the plan will be classified.11 According to the Seventh 
Circuit, a debtor does not have the choice to prohibit credit bidding for an 
asset sale plan. Thus, the statutory interpretation of § 1129(b) can be boiled 
down to proponent choice, on the one hand, and functional classification on 
the other. 
This Note will discuss the Supreme Court’s resolution of the circuit 
split formed by the three key cases. It will first explain how a plan can be 
crammed down within bankruptcy, highlighting additional procedural 
requirements incident to confirming a plan under the various subprovisions 
of § 1129(b). It will continue with a discussion of the three cases that 
formed this circuit splitRiver Road, In re Philadelphia Newspapers, and 
In re The Pacific Lumber Co.highlighting the differences in their 
reasoning. It will then discuss the Supreme Court’s brief opinion resolving 
the circuit split. 
The Note will continue with an analysis of the recent trends in 
bankruptcy in which credit bidding is used as a tool to undermine the 
reorganizational goal of a Chapter 11 proceeding. Granting courts and 
debtors the choice to restrict credit bidding may offer a remedy to 
aggressive credit bidding tactics, benefitting debtors and increasing the 
likelihood of a productive rehabilitation of their businesses. Next, I will 
discuss the two-step analysis courts must apply in order to confirm a plan 
under the indubitable equivalent standard of § 1129(b) and show that the 
Supreme Court’s failure to conduct this analysis led it to erroneously 
interpret the statute. First, I will argue that a plan that proposes to sell 
assets of the debtor free and clear of liens may be confirmed under the 
indubitable equivalent prong. Second, I maintain that an asset sale plan that 
restricts credit bidding will provide creditors with the indubitable 
equivalent of their claim if the creditors are paid, in full, the judicially 
determined value of their claim. In light of this, I argue that Congress 
should respond to the Supreme Court’s opinion by revising the credit 
bidding provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
I. THE CRAMDOWN REQUIREMENTS OF § 1129(B) 
Central to the controversy at hand is the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(b): the cramdown provision of the Bankruptcy Code. This section 
will briefly discuss the cramdown provision, including its purpose and 
requirements. Because a full understanding of the cramdown provision 
requires additional knowledge of a bankruptcy proceeding, the following 
three subsections will discuss the concepts of indubitable equivalence, 
valuation, and credit bidding. 
 
11 River Rd., 651 F.3d at 652. 
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Debtors choose to file a Chapter 11 reorganization instead of a Chapter 
7 liquidation because they wish to continue operating as a reorganized 
business after the bankruptcy process.12 In order to allow this outcome, 
Chapter 11 requires debtors to propose and confirm a plan of 
reorganization. This plan allows a debtor to restructure its assets, discharge 
its debts, and continue its operations.13 
Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code provides the minimum 
requirements for confirming a plan.14 In the majority of cases, a plan will 
have the support of all classes of creditors and be confirmed by consent.15 
In order for any plan to be confirmed via consent, the Code requires all 
impaired16 classes of creditors to approve the plan.17 However, if a plan 
does not have the support of all classes of creditors, § 1129(b) provides the 
means for a plan to be confirmed despite the objection by a class of 
creditors (known as a “cramdown”).18 If a proposed plan lacks unanimous 
support of all classes of impaired creditors, it may still be confirmed 
against dissenting creditors if “the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and 
is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests 
that . . . has not accepted[] the plan.”19 
The Code does not add clarity to what is meant by “does not 
discriminate unfairly.” However, after analyzing the legislative history, 
Kenneth Klee notes: “In a nutshell, if the plan protects the legal rights of a 
dissenting class in a manner consistent with the treatment of other 
classes . . . then the plan does not discriminate unfairly with respect to the 
dissenting class.”20 The Code provides for a plan to be “fair and equitable 
with respect to a class” of creditors if it includes one of three 
 
12 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.07[1][a], at 1-25 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2012); 7 id. ¶ 1129.01, at 1129-11. 
13 7 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 1129.01, at 1129-11 to -13.  
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)–(6) (2006); In re The Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 245. See also 
Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 136–37 (1979) for a summary of these provisions. 
15 Wayne Johnson, In re Bonner Mall Partnership: The Ninth Circuit Embraces the New Value 
“Exception,” 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 259, 259 n.8 (1993); Klee, supra note 14, at 133. 
16 11 U.S.C. § 1124 defines when a class of claims or interests is unimpaired and, thus, does not 
have to vote to accept a plan under § 1129. Section 1124(1) dictates that a creditor is unimpaired when 
the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights” of the creditor. Under § 1124(2), 
a plan may also leave creditors unimpaired if it cures defaults, reinstates the maturity of the claim, 
compensates the holder for any damages, and does not otherwise alter any creditors’ rights. See 
7 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 1124.01, at 1124-3. An impaired creditor is one that does not fit the 
characteristics of § 1124. 
17 § 1129(a)(8). 
18 Id. § 1129(b). 
19 Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
20 Klee, supra note 14, at 142. 
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requirements.21 First, the plan may provide for a creditor to retain liens and 
receive deferred cash payments totaling the present value of the claim as of 
the date of the plan.22 Second, the plan may instead provide for a sale of the 
debtor’s assets free and clear of liens, subject to § 363(k) of the Code 
granting the debtors the presumptive right to credit bid, with the liens 
attaching to the proceeds of the sale.23 
The third option dictates that the plan may provide for the creditors to 
receive the “indubitable equivalent” of their claim.24 The phrase 
“indubitable equivalence” was first coined by Judge Learned Hand in 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel 
Holding Corp.) as a means of cramming down a plan of reorganization 
under the prior Bankruptcy Code.25 This provision allows a bankruptcy 
court to support alternative means of plan reorganization proposed by the 
debtor, so long as the creditor receives the benefit of its bargain: the 
undeniable equivalent of the value of its claim.26 The legislative history 
surrounding this subprovision is brief, but provides two examples of what 
could qualify as indubitable equivalence: abandoning the collateral to the 
class of creditors, or granting the creditors a replacement lien on similar 
collateral.27 In both instances, the creditor is realizing the value of its 
secured claim. 
Central to the circuit split is the nature of these three cramdown 
subprovisions. The Fifth and Third Circuits held that the three alternatives 
Congress provided in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) are nonexclusive 
requirements.28 A debtor may satisfy any one of them, or be granted any 
other reasonable means of “fair and equitable” treatment.29 However, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a plan may only be crammed down under the 
indubitable equivalent standard of subsection (iii) if the plan does not 
provide for treatment similar to that found in options (i) or (ii).30 The 
Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit’s logic, affirming that how a 
plan is structured will dictate under which provision it must be confirmed.31 
 
21 § 1129(b)(2). 
22 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). 
23 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
24 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
25 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel 
Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935). 
26 In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d at 942. 
27 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978). 
28 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305–06; Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured 
Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 245 (5th Cir. 2009). 
29 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 309–10; In re The Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 245. 
30 River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 652 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d sub 
nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). 
31 RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2072–73. 
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A. The Indubitable Equivalent Standard 
An understanding of the cramdown provision of the Bankruptcy Code 
would be incomplete without a discussion of what the Code means by 
indubitable equivalence. In order for a plan to be confirmed under 
subsection (iii) of § 1129(b), the plan must provide for the creditor to 
realize the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.32 The Bankruptcy Code 
does not define indubitable equivalence, but uses the term in both 
§ 1129(b)—allowing confirmation of a plan over the objection of a class of 
creditors33—and in § 361—providing adequate protection to secured 
creditors during a Chapter 11 case.34 The legislative history for § 1129 
dictates that “[t]he indubitable equivalent language is intended to follow 
the strict approach taken by Judge Learned Hand in In Re Murel Holding 
Corp.”35 
In In re Murel Holding Corp., the debtors, who owned a residential 
apartment building in which Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. held a 
security interest, proposed a plan of reorganization pursuant to § 77(B) of 
the former Bankruptcy Code.36 According to this plan, the debtors would 
remodel the apartment complex and repay Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 
over a ten-year period with the proceeds.37 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 
refused to consent to this plan and requested that the district court vacate 
the stay of its foreclosure proceedings against the debtors; however, the 
district court denied the motion.38 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Judge Hand held that the district 
court was not entitled to grant a stay against foreclosure.39 Judge Hand 
reasoned that unwilling creditors could only be forced to accept a plan of 
reorganization if the plan “provide[d] adequate protection for the 
realization . . . of the full value of their interest, claims, or liens.”40 Judge 
Hand then elaborated on what constitutes “adequate protection”: 
It is plain that “adequate protection” must be completely compensatory; and 
that payment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now. 
Interest is indeed the common measure of the difference, but a creditor who 
fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content with that; he wishes to 
 
32 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). 
33 Id. § 1129(b). 
34 Id. § 361 (providing a list of potential ways to provide adequate protection when required under 
§§ 362, 363, or 364). 
35 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 127 (1978). 
36 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 941–42 
(2d Cir. 1935). 
37 Id. at 942. 
38 Id. at 941–42. 
39 Id. at 943. 
40 Id. at 942. 
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get his money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the 
statute was intended to deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders, 
unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.41 
Importantly, Judge Hand outlined four ways in which a creditor could 
receive adequate protection: (1) the liens could be maintained; (2) the 
property could be sold free of the liens with the liens attaching to the 
proceeds; (3) “[t]he value of the liens” could be appraised and paid by the 
creditor; or (4) the judge may “equitably and fairly . . . provide such 
protection, that is, adequate protection, when the other methods are not 
chosen.”42 These four options for providing adequate protection in the 
cramdown context still appear in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. If a 
creditor’s liens are maintained, the creditor is classified as “unimpaired” 
and by definition will receive the full value of its bargain. Unimpaired 
creditors do not need to consent to any plan confirmation.43 The remaining 
three options appear as the cramdown provisions in § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
Selling the property free and clear of liens is codified in 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), appraising the value of the liens and having them paid 
by the creditor is codified in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), and Judge Hand’s 
indubitable equivalent standard appears in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).44 Since 
Judge Hand’s opinion heavily influenced the cramdown provisions in the 
Bankruptcy Code,45 the provisions themselves should be understood with In 
re Murel Holding Corp.’s reasoning in mind. 
The indubitable equivalent standard Judge Hand established in In re 
Murel Holding Corp. also appears in § 361 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Section 361 provides the means a court may use to grant adequate 
protection to a creditor during the bankruptcy process.46 During a Chapter 
11 proceeding, creditors are prohibited from foreclosing on their collateral 
without judicial permission, and debtors are permitted to cease all 
maintenance payments to creditors under a provision called the “automatic 
stay.”47 Because of this, a creditor may fear its collateral will decline in 
value over time and petition for relief from the automatic stay in order to 
remove its collateral.48 The court must grant the petition if the debtor does 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. (citing and quoting 11 U.S.C. § 207(b)(5) (1935) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) 
(2006))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43 § 1124. See also supra note 16 (discussing unimpaired creditors). 
44 § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). 
45 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
46 § 361. 
47 Id. § 362(a); see also 1 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 1.05[1], at 1-19 to -20. 
48 3 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 362.07, at 362-104 to -105. See also id. ¶ 362.08 for a discussion of 
the procedures for seeking relief from a stay. 
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not provide adequate protection49 to ensure that the creditor’s property 
rights in its collateral are not compromised.50 
Cases addressing whether a creditor is realizing the indubitable 
equivalent of its claim focus their analysis on Judge Hand’s two-prong 
approach of value and risk: the plan must adequately compensate the 
creditor for the current value of its claimincluding principal and 
interestand for the risk that the principal will not be repaid.51 Despite this 
test’s stringency, the indubitable equivalent standard gives bankruptcy 
judges sufficient flexibility to craft reorganization plans to fit the facts and 
circumstances of a given case.52 
B. Valuation of a Creditor’s Claim 
Valuation of a creditor’s claim by a bankruptcy court is another 
essential factor in § 1129 cramdown proceedings. In order for a plan to be 
confirmed under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)—providing for deferred cash 
payments totaling the present value of the claim—a claim must first be 
valued.53 In addition, valuing a claim is necessary to ensure that a creditor 
receives the indubitable equivalent of its claim under subsection (iii). 
Section 1129 requires a secured creditor to be compensated in the 
“allowed amount” of its claim.54 Chapter 11 calls for either the bankruptcy 
trustee55 or the debtor56 to file schedules of claims at the commencement of 
the case. Any filed claim is presumptively allowed unless an interested 
party objects.57 If an objection arises, the claim is evaluated both for 
 
49 One form of adequate protection granted by courts is periodic cash payments from the debtor to 
the creditor in order to compensate the creditor for the decline in collateral value during the automatic 
stay. Id. ¶ 362.07[3][b][i]. Other means include requiring the debtor to insure the property and requiring 
the debtor to pay any taxes on the property. Id. ¶ 362.07[3][f], at 362-117. 
50 Id. ¶ 362.07[3], at 362-106. 
51 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942–
43 (2d Cir. 1935); see also Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc. (In re Sun Country Dev., Inc.), 764 F.2d 
406, 409 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing the value and risk of replacement liens). 
52 See, e.g., In re Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d at 409 (finding the indubitable equivalent 
standard met when the debtor substituted one lien on 200 acres of land for twenty-one separate liens on 
twenty-one individual lots); Woods v. Pine Mountain, Ltd. (In re Pine Mountain, Ltd.), 80 B.R. 171, 
174–75 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the indubitable equivalent standard could be satisfied with 
a subordinated note that provided enough equity cushion on the prime note); In re May, 174 B.R. 832, 
840 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (agreeing to confirm a plan if the debtors amended it to surrender a portion 
of the creditor’s collateral). 
53 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. § 1106(a)(2) (explaining that the duties of a trustee include filing of the schedule of claims “if 
the debtor has not done so”). 
56 Id. § 521(a)(1). 
57 Id. § 502(a). Any creditor, indenture trustee, or equity security holder may file a proof of claim 
or interest in the estate. Id. § 501(a). 
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allowance and for valuation as of the date of the petition.58 This process 
determines the allowed amount of claim compensation for purposes of 
§ 1129.59 
The value of a claim may be determined judicially or by sale at 
auction.60 In order to establish the dollar value of a claim, the court must 
determine the current market value of the collateral (if any) securing the 
loan. A judicial determination of collateral takes place at a hearing, 
pursuant to § 506(a)(1).61 Judicially determining the value of a claim can be 
a very complex process. Section 506(a)(1) directs valuation to be made “in 
light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use 
of such property”;62 however, it does not provide additional guidance. 
When addressing this flexibility, the Supreme Court in Associates 
Commercial Corp. v. Rash was careful not to prescribe an overly particular 
valuation standard for the bankruptcy courts, noting that facts and 
circumstances should govern each individual decision: “Our recognition 
that the replacement-value standard, not the foreclosure-value standard, 
governs in cram down cases leaves to bankruptcy courts, as triers of fact, 
identification of the best way of ascertaining replacement value on the basis 
of the evidence presented.”63 
A bankruptcy court can also value a claim through an auction sale of 
the collateral. A debtor may sell its assets with judicial approval outside of 
the ordinary course of business pursuant to § 363(b), or may sell its assets 
as part of a plan of reorganization pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).64 If the 
collateral is to be sold during a liquidation sale of the debtor’s assets or as a 
part of a reorganization plan, the value of the collateral should be 
substantially equivalent to the consideration received by the estate at the 
 
58 See id. § 502(b) (providing that “the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount 
of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition”). 
59 Id. This section provides nine reasons why a claim may be disallowed, including claims that are 
unenforceable, claims for insiders, and claims that were not timely filed. Id. All other properly filed 
claims of creditors will be allowed. These include claims secured by a lien and properly recorded 
pursuant to the UCC (for example, a mortgage or lien on inventory or other property); unsecured claims 
that are protected by statute (for example, labor wage claims, claims for retirement benefits, or claims 
for payment for services); or any other claims to ownership of the business (for example, bondholders 
or shareholders). 
60 River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d sub 
nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). 
61 § 506(a)(1); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 506.03[4][a], at 506-22 to -23. 
62 § 506(a)(1). 
63 520 U.S. 953, 965 n.6 (1997). 
64 § 363(b)(1) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the 
ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“[The plan provides] 
for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject to the liens securing 
such claims, free and clear of such liens . . . .”). 
107:1881 (2013) Betting on the Upside 
1891 
sale.65 Many bankruptcy courts have noted that as long as the sale 
conditions are fair, and the transaction took place at arm’s length, the 
consideration received through a sale is a better indicator of collateral value 
than an appraiser’s estimate.66 
Secured claims that are allowed by the bankruptcy court receive 
special attention by the Code. Oversecured claims—claims in which the 
face value of the claim is less than the current market value of the 
collateral—are allowed to the full amount of the debt.67 On the other hand, 
undersecured claimswhere the claim’s face value is greater than the 
current market value of the collateralare bifurcated.68 These claims are 
divided into a secured claim to the extent of the current market value of the 
collateral securing the claim and an unsecured claim for the balance.69 
A creditor may avoid the bifurcation process of § 506(a) by election 
and treat the entire face value of its claim as secured under § 1111(b)(2).70 
A creditor may not make a § 1111(b) election if its interest in the collateral 
is of “inconsequential value,” or if the creditor “has recourse against the 
debtor” and the collateral is to be sold pursuant to § 363 or under a plan of 
reorganization.71 This election is attractive to creditors who are retaining 
liens on the collateral through reorganization and believe both that their 
collateral is undervalued and that the debtor is likely to reenter bankruptcy 
before satisfying the creditor’s claim.72 The risk of a restructured entity 
filing for bankruptcy again is substantial, occurring between 25% and 33% 
 
65 4 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 506.03[6][b], at 506-37. 
66 Romley v. Sun Nat’l Bank (In re The Two “S” Corp.), 875 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“Evidence of other appraised values is also irrelevant, because the sale price is a better indicator of the 
asset’s value than any estimate of value given prior to sale.”). See also Takisaki v. Alpine Grp., Inc. (In 
re Alpine Grp., Inc.), 151 B.R. 931, 935 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (“The offered price . . . is conclusive 
evidence of the property’s value.”). Conversely, evidence of value obtained by an offer to purchase the 
collateral may not be persuasive if the terms of the offer are not acceptable to the debtor and the offer is 
rejected. See In re Smith, 42 B.R. 198, 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). 
67 § 506(a)(1) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate 
has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s 
interest in such property . . . .”). The Code defines the concept of “collateral” as the “creditor’s interest 
in the estate’s interest in such property.” Id. The Supreme Court has confirmed that this phrase should 
be interpreted as the common notion of “collateral.” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988). 
68 4 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 506.03[4], at 506-20. 
69 § 506(a)(1); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 506.03[4], at 506-20 & n.57. 
70 See, e.g., In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826, 829, 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2012); 680 Fifth Ave. 
Assocs. v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. in Rehab. (In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs.), 29 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 
1994) (“Section 1111(b) allows an undersecured creditor either to elect to have its entire claim treated 
as secured, or to have the claim bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions, notwithstanding the fact 
that under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1), the nonrecourse nature of the loan would otherwise bar a deficiency 
claim for the unsecured portion of the loan.”). 
71 § 1111(b)(1)(B). 
72 In re River E. Plaza, 669 F.3d at 830. 
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of the time.73 By making this election, a creditor foregoes the right to an 
immediate payment of the secured claim in exchange for maintaining a lien 
over the property, with the expectation that it will either be paid by the 
debtor over time or yield greater proceeds from a later foreclosure sale of 
the recovered collateral.74 
C. Credit Bidding During a Sale of Assets Free and Clear of Liens 
The final critical topic for understanding § 1129 cramdown 
proceedings is the credit bidding process. In order for a plan to be 
confirmed under § 1129(b)(ii), a sale of the debtor’s assets must be 
conducted subject to § 363(k).75 Section 363(k) permits a creditor with an 
allowed claim to bid for the debtor’s assets at auction and, “unless the court 
for cause orders otherwise,” to offset the value of its lien “against the 
purchase price of [the] property.”76 This practice is commonly referred to as 
“credit bidding,” and was recognized under bankruptcy law prior to the 
current Code.77 In practice, credit bidding authorizes a creditor with an 
allowed claim78 to bid on credit at an auction sale up to the full face value 
of its claim.79 This is true even if the creditor’s claim is 
 
73 Id.; see also Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from 
Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161, 162 (1997); Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy 
Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. FIN. 3, 15 (1995); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. 
Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL 
L. REV. 597, 608 (1993); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization 
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
153, 188 (2004). 
74 In re River E. Plaza, 669 F.3d at 830. In order to better illustrate this provision, imagine a lender 
holds a $100 million secured interest in a piece of property, the value of which has declined to $50 
million. Traditional bifurcation would allow for a $50 million secured loan that would receive priority 
repayment in the plan, and a $50 million unsecured claim that in most cases is unlikely to be repaid. If 
the lender would prefer to terminate its relationship with the debtor, is not confident that the company 
will survive reorganization, or is concerned that the collateral will continue to decrease in value, it 
might prefer to take the current value in bifurcation. However, if the lender believes that the value of 
the property will increase or that the debtor will be capable of making payments once reorganized, the 
creditor may prefer to make a § 1111(b) election and retain a secured lien for the original $100 million 
value. The creditor could then negotiate structured payments over a period of time (for example, five 
years) in order to repay the $100 million loan. 
75 § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
76 Id. § 363(k). 
77 See, e.g., Morgan v. Blieden (In re Mun. Gas Co.), 107 F.2d 133, 134 (8th Cir. 1939); Miners 
Sav. Bank of Pittston, Pa. v. Joyce, 97 F.2d 973, 975 (3d Cir. 1938). 
78 See Nat’l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. McMullan (In re McMullan), 196 B.R. 818, 835 
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996) (holding that a creditor may not bid on a lien that has not yet been determined 
to be valid). 
79 3 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 363.09, at 363-79. See also 4 id. ¶ 506.02, at 506-8 to -9 
(summarizing provisions within the Bankruptcy Code that protect the holders of secured claims). 
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undersecuredmeaning the present market value of the collateral securing 
the claim is less than the face value of the claim.80 
To illustrate this concept by example, suppose Debtor borrowed $100 
million from Creditor secured by Debtor’s rental apartment complex. Later, 
when the apartment complex is only worth $50 million, Debtor files for 
bankruptcy. In the plan of reorganization, Debtor wishes to sell the 
apartment complex at auction and use the proceeds to pay Creditor’s claim. 
At the auction, Creditor may “bid” up to $100 millionthe face value of 
Creditor’s claim. Because the apartment complex has a current market 
value of $50 million, Creditor may easily become the highest bidder at 
auction without using any additional cash. 
A bankruptcy auction determines the market value of the 
collateralthe value of the secured claimbut a creditor’s claim may be 
bifurcated into a secured portion and an unsecured portion. If Creditor with 
a $100 million face-value claim bids $50 million on the property (the 
current market value) and wins, Creditor still retains an unsecured $50 
million claim on the estate for the difference. If, however, it takes an $80 
million credit bid to guarantee a win at auction, Creditor only retains a $20 
million unsecured claim against the estate. This is of little import, however, 
as unsecured claims are rarely paid, and when they are it is for mere 
pennies on the dollar.81 To a creditor, the value of its claim is the value of 
the secured portion of its claim. 
The presumptive right to credit bid provides many advantages to 
creditors. It is often seen as a check against low valuation of collateral at an 
auction sale.82 Alternatively, some view credit bidding as granting secured 
lenders the right to ensure collateral is not sold at a value below a price to 
which they would consent.83 Most importantly, if a lender cannot obtain the 
requisite cash to bid in an auction, credit bidding may be the only way a 
lender is able to attend. One of the best ways to increase the amount 
realized at auction is to increase the quantity of interested bidders.84 Credit 
bidding may be a double-edged sword, however, as debtors frequently 
 
80 See, e.g., Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 460–
61 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a creditor’s bid sets the creditor’s allowed secured claim under 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)); In re Morgan House Gen. P’ship, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1306, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 7, 1997); In re Realty Invs., Ltd., 72 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 
56 (1978) (“No prior valuation under section 506(a) would limit this bidding right, since the bid at the 
sale would be determinative of value.”). 
81 Douglas Baird et al., The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study 
19, 21–23 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=866865. 
82 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 334 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. 
84 See Buccola & Keller, supra note 1, at 119–20 (discussing the dynamics of a bankruptcy auction 
and the impact of credit bidding). 
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argue that credit bidding “chill[s]” auctions.85 When prospective bidders 
find themselves in competition with a credit bidder who has resources far 
in excess of the current market value of the assets, the prospective bidders 
may deem the cost of entering the auction not worth the substantial 
likelihood of being outbid.86 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The Supreme Court has recently resolved the split between the circuits 
on the means by which a plan can be confirmed under § 1129 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.87 The Seventh Circuit mandated a functional 
classification of a plan in which the debtor may not restrict credit bidding 
during an asset sale. It held that a plan that proposes to sell substantially all 
of the debtor’s assets free of liens may not be confirmed under the 
indubitable equivalent standard of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) without granting the 
creditors the right to credit bid.88 The Fifth Circuit and Third Circuit 
granted the debtor the choice of restricting credit bidding during an asset 
sale. They maintained that a plan that proposes to sell the debtor’s assets 
may be confirmed under the indubitable equivalent standard without credit 
bidding if the plan ensures the creditors will receive the indubitable 
equivalent of their claim.89 The Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel 
affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that a plan that proposes to sell assets 
free and clear of liens must be crammed down under subprovision (ii) and 
presumptively permit credit bidding.90 This section will discuss the cases 
that formed this split and how the judges involved are simultaneously 
trying to adhere to the true meaning of § 1129(b), as well as provide 
guidance that agrees with the commercial realities of a bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
A. In re The Pacific Lumber Co. 
In re The Pacific Lumber Co.91 was the first case to hold that a plan 
could be confirmed under § 1129 as fair and equitable with respect to a 
 
85 Adam D. Marshall, Shifting Strategies for Secured Creditors: Credit Bidding as a Continuing 
Strategic Option in Chapter 11 Cases, ASPATORE (Jan. 2011), 2011 WL 190431, at *3; see also Daniel 
P. Winikka & Debra K. Simpson, Will Bankruptcy Courts Limit the Right to Credit Bid?, 17 NORTON J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 921, 924 (2008). 
86 For further discussion on courts’ responses to the argument that credit bidding chills auctions, 
and for a real case example demonstrating the chilling phenomenon, see infra Part III.A. 
87 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2072 (2012), aff’g River 
Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011). 
88 River Rd., 651 F.3d at 651. 
89 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 311 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. 
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009). 
90 RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2073. 
91 584 F.3d at 247, 249. 
107:1881 (2013) Betting on the Upside 
1895 
dissenting class of creditors even if a sale of the creditor’s collateral did not 
afford the opportunity to credit bid. This Chapter 11 proceeding concerned 
a plan to restructure six affiliated entities all involved in the timber 
business in California.92 After the restructuring, the principal creditor and a 
key competitor would pay $580 million to satisfy the other creditors and 
would own all of the assets of the business.93 All but two classes of 
creditors approved the plan.94 
To confirm the plan, the bankruptcy court proceeded to “cram down” 
the plan on the dissenting creditors in accordance with § 1129(b).95 Proving 
that the plan was fair and equitable required the court to value the assets 
securing their claim. The bankruptcy court conducted a judicial valuation, 
hearing “extensive valuation testimony over several days,” and concluded 
the assets were worth “not more than $510 million.”96 The bankruptcy court 
held that the valuation of $510 million in cash was the “indubitable 
equivalent” of the creditors’ secured claim according to § 1129(b).97 
The creditors appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the Fifth 
Circuit, challenging that the plan was “not ‘fair and equitable’ because the 
plan sold the [assets] without providing the [creditors] a right to credit 
bid.”98 The creditors contended that since the plan proposed to sell the 
assets, the plan must conform with the requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), 
granting the creditors the right to credit bid pursuant to § 363(k).99 The 
creditors insisted that the ability to credit bid would protect them against 
what they perceived to be an undervaluation of their collateral.100 
In response, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that a reorganization plan may 
be fair and equitable to a class of dissenting creditors if it provides the 
creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of their claim by any means.101 
The court first determined the asset transfer was a sale, but held that 
“because the three subsections of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are joined by the 
disjunctive ‘or,’ they are alternatives,” and thus compliance with any one of 
the subsections may permit a finding of “fair and equitable.”102 The court 
also noted that the word “includes” in § 1129(b)(2) shows that the three 
alternatives proposed for plan confirmation are not exhaustive and 
 
92 Id. at 236–37. 
93 Id. 




98 Id. at 239. 
99 Id. at 245. 
100 Id. at 244. 
101 Id. at 246. 
102 Id. at 245. 
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reiterated that “[e]ven a plan compliant with these alternative minimum 
standards is not necessarily fair and equitable.”103 The court concluded that 
confirming an asset sale under indubitable equivalence does not render 
options (i) and (ii) superfluous as the standard of indubitable equivalence is 
“no less demanding a standard than its companions.”104 The Fifth Circuit 
scrutinized the valuation proceedings and determined they were not clearly 
erroneous and represented a fair value of the creditor’s secured claim.105 
Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, § 1129 does not require the 
opportunity to credit bid. 
B. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC 
The Third Circuit was the next to confront this issue in In re 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.106 This case presented a similar situation in 
which a proposed plan for the sale of assets free and clear of liens 
prohibited the creditors from credit bidding at auction.107 Unlike In re The 
Pacific Lumber Co., this plan proposed that the value of the debtors’ assets 
be determined at the auction sale, rather than via a judicial process.108 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, a publishing company, filed for 
Chapter 11 protection after defaulting on a $318 million loan secured by 
substantially all of its assets.109 The debtors proposed a reorganization plan 
whereby their assets would be sold free of liens at an all-cash public 
auction, precluding the creditors from credit bidding.110 As proposed, the 
plan would generate “$37 million in cash for the [l]enders,” plus the 
lenders would receive a property “valued at $29.5 million, subject to a two-
year rent free lease.”111 If additional cash were raised at the auction, the 
lenders would receive these proceeds.112 
The lenders objected to the bid procedures, prompting the bankruptcy 
court to issue an order refusing to restrict credit bidding at the auction.113 
The bankruptcy court reasoned that although the plan was proceeding 
under the § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) option of plan confirmation—the indubitable 
equivalent prong—the plan was structured as a sale free and clear of liens 
under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) in every way except for the prohibition on credit 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 246. 
105 Id. at 248–49. 
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bidding.114 According to the court, structuring the plan as a sale free and 
clear of liens required it to proceed under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).115 The 
bankruptcy court then modified the plan to permit credit bidding and the 
debtors appealed to the district court, which reversed.116 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that 
§ 1129(b) permits a bankruptcy court to confirm a plan so long as the 
creditor will receive the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.117 The Third 
Circuit opined that the plain meaning of § 1129(b) is unambiguous, and as 
a result the court must follow the statute’s language.118 The statute 
purposefully employs the word “or,” which is defined in § 102(5) of the 
Code.119 The Code defines “or” as nonexclusive, and a statutory note 
dictates that “if a party ‘may do (a) or (b)’, then the party may do either or 
both.”120 “The party is not limited to a mutually exclusive choice between 
the two alternatives.”121 
The Third Circuit further concluded that the specific method of 
confirming a plan in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) does not operate to limit the 
broader language of (iii), and thus the canon of construction that the 
“specific governs the general” is not applicable.122 Unlike In re The Pacific 
Lumber Co., the Third Circuit did not analyze whether the debtors’ 
proposed plan satisfied indubitable equivalence, but merely said that a plan 
proposing to sell collateral free and clear of liens at an all-cash auction 
could satisfy the indubitable equivalent standard.123 The In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers debtors proceeded with their plan of an all-cash auction and 





117 Id. at 304. 
118 Id. at 305. 
119 Id. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 307–08. The Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel described how this canon would 
apply to § 1129(b):  
[T]he [general/specific] canon has full application . . . to statutes such as the one here, in which a 
general authorization and a more limited, specific authorization exist side-by-side. . . . Here, 
clause (ii) is a detailed provision that spells out the requirements for selling collateral free of liens, 
while clause (iii) is a broadly worded provision that says nothing about such a sale. The 
general/specific canon explains that the general language of clause (iii), although broad enough to 
include it, will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in clause (ii).  
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071–72 (2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), aff’g River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
123 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 312–13. 
124 See infra Part III.A.  
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C. In re Philadelphia Newspapers Dissent by Judge Ambro 
The majority opinion in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC sparked 
a thorough dissent by Judge Ambro, who argued that § 1129(b) is an 
ambiguous statute necessitating an analysis of legislative history, statutory 
context, and additional canons of statutory construction to choose between 
two plausible interpretations.125 Judge Ambro first rejected the majority’s 
conclusion that § 102(5) of the Bankruptcy Code defining “or” as “not 
exclusive” means that the three subprovisions within § 1129 must be 
nonexclusive.126 He cited to additional provisions of the Code—including 
§§ 365(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 506(d)(1)–(2), and 1112(b)(1)—where “or” is 
interpreted to provide exclusive limitations.127 From this, Judge Ambro 
concluded that the operative word in § 1129 is “provides,” not “includes,” 
as the majority suggested.128 
With emphasis on “provides” and a reading of “or” as exclusive, Judge 
Ambro reasoned that “Congress did not list the three alternatives as routes 
to cramdown confirmation that were universally applicable to any plan, but 
instead as distinct routes that apply specific requirements depending on 
how a given plan proposes to treat the claims of secured creditors.”129 
Under this plausible reading of the statute, if a plan provides for a creditor 
to retain liens on transferred property, it must follow clause (i). Similarly, if 
the plan sells the property free and clear of liens, it must follow clause (ii). 
And finally, only if the plan provides for something else not governed by 
 
125 599 F.3d at 319 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
126 Id. at 324. 
127 Id. See also Williams v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. (In re Williams), 168 F.3d 845, 847–48 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1325(a)(5)(B) and (C) required an exclusive “or” construction to avoid 
creating an option that Congress did not intend to create); 2 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 102.06, at 102–
16 & n.1 (noting that reading “or” nonexclusively is only appropriate “if context and practicality allow” 
and calling attention to § 1112(b) as an instance where “[i]t would be impossible for the court to do 
both” of the statute’s alternatives). 
128 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 324–25 (Ambro, J., dissenting). The text of 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) reads: 
With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides— 
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether the 
property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the 
extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and 
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred cash 
payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of 
the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property; 
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject to the 
liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of 
such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this 
subparagraph; or 
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims. 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
129 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 325 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
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either clause (i) or (ii) may it follow the indubitable equivalent standard of 
clause (iii).130 Judge Ambro concluded that since the debtors’ plan proposes 
to sell the collateral free and clear of liens, it must follow clause (ii) and 
presumptively permit the creditors to credit bid up to the full value of their 
claim at auction.131 He then analyzed the credit bidding right of § 1129 in 
conjunction with §§ 1111(b)132 and 363(k)133 to conclude that these sections 
are “part of a comprehensive arrangement enacted by Congress to avoid the 
pitfalls of undervaluation, regardless of the mechanism chosen.”134 Judge 
Ambro closed by analyzing the practical impact of failing to allow secured 
parties to credit bid when they rely upon it. He opined that it would likely 
raise the cost of capital as creditors must account for the likelihood of 
undervaluation.135 
D. River Road Hotel Partners 
The most recent circuit to weigh in on the credit bidding debate was 
the Seventh Circuit in River Road Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank.136 
The debtors in this case were in the business of constructing airport hotels 
and had voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 protection after construction costs 
greatly exceeded their expectations.137 The debtors filed a reorganization 
plan that proposed to sell substantially all of their assets without permitting 
the creditors to credit bid and without having the bankruptcy court 
judicially value the assets in advance of the sale.138 The lead creditor 
objected to this plan, forcing the debtors to request confirmation under 
prong (iii) of § 1129(b)(2)(A).139 The bankruptcy court refused to confirm 
the plan without granting the creditors the right to credit bid, citing Judge 
Ambro’s dissent in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, and the debtors 
appealed the case directly to the Seventh Circuit.140 
The Seventh Circuit, affirming the bankruptcy court, reasoned that 
“there are two plausible interpretations of the” plain language of 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) and the ambiguity required an analysis of canons of 
 
130 Id. at 326–27. 
131 Id. at 330–33. 
132 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) allows an undersecured, nonrecourse creditor to elect secured recourse 
treatment unless its collateral is sold through § 363(k) or pursuant to a plan. See supra Part I.B. 
133 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) grants a presumptive right to credit bid when assets are sold outside of the 
ordinary course of business. 
134 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 334 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. at 337. 
136 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated 
Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). 
137 Id. at 643–44. 
138 Id. at 645. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 645, 647. 
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construction and statutory context to choose the more plausible option.141 It 
found Judge Ambro’s statutory analysis in In re Philadelphia Newspapers 
compelling, and also pointed out an inconsistency that would arise between 
methods of valuation supported by the Code if the debtors’ argument were 
followed.142 The court noted that the Code “recognizes two basic 
mechanisms for solving these types of valuation problems: judicial 
valuation of an asset’s value, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1), and free market 
valuation of an asset’s value as established in an open auction, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 363(k), 1129(b)(2)(A).”143 The court reasoned that because both 
§§ 363(k) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) contain a presumptive right to credit bid 
when collateral value is determined at an open auction, any sale of 
collateral in which the value is to be determined at auction should 
presumptively include a right to credit bid.144 To hold that creditors have 
the right to credit bid during an auction sale of assets under § 363(k) but do 
not have the right to credit bid during an auction sale under 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) would create inconsistency within the Bankruptcy Code.145 
Based on this analysis, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to 
hold that a § 1129 plan that proposes to sell “encumbered assets free and 
clear of liens at an auction [must] satisfy the requirements set forth in 
Subsection (ii) of the statute.”146 This holding conflicts with the Third 
Circuit in In re Philadelphia Newspapers; however, it is potentially 
reconcilable with the Fifth Circuit in In re The Pacific Lumber Co. As the 
Seventh Circuit noted, there are two ways to determine collateral value 
during a bankruptcy proceeding: (1) judicial valuation or (2) valuation by 
auction.147 In In re The Pacific Lumber Co., the collateral’s value was 
determined judicially, and thus the judge verified indubitable equivalence 
in advance of plan confirmation.148 
E. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank 
The Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel resolved the circuit 
split and affirmed the Seventh Circuit in a brief opinion by Justice Scalia.149 
Without justification, the Court deemed the text of § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
 
141 Id. at 643, 649–51. 
142 Id. at 649–50. 
143 Id. at 650. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 653. 
147 Id. at 650. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 96–97. 
149 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2068, 2073 (2012), 
aff’g River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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unambiguous150 and yet called the debtor’s interpretation—permitting a 
plan to satisfy any subsection per the use of the disjunctive “or”—
“hyperliteral and contrary to common sense.”151 In the Supreme Court’s 
“unambiguous” reading, what the plan proposes to do governs the 
provision under which it must be confirmed.152 The Court asserted that 
“[a]s a matter of law, no bid procedures like the ones proposed here [an 
auction sale free and clear of liens without credit bidding] could satisfy the 
requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A).”153 The Court concluded this by resorting 
to a common canon of statutory construction: “the specific governs the 
general.”154 Curiously, however, the Court did not analyze additional 
textual indications,155 and deemed analyzing the general statutory purpose 
or pre-Code practices as appropriate only if the text were ambiguous.156 
The Supreme Court did not explain why it employed a canon of 
statutory construction if the text is unambiguous, nor did it explain why the 
interpretation might be swayed by textual indications157 but not by 
analyzing the general statutory purpose or pre-Code practices.158 The Court 
concluded by asserting that the merits of credit bidding, argued extensively 
by the parties and on both sides of the circuit split, “are for the 
consideration of Congress, not the courts.”159 Unfortunately, in doing so the 
Court unnecessarily limited the cramdown options available to the 
bankruptcy courts, essentially doing away with an alternative method of 
plan valuation and fostering aggressive lending strategies harmful to the 
rehabilitation of businesses. The impact of the RadLAX decision on 
businesses will be explored more fully in the remainder of this Note. 
III. RESTRICTING CREDIT BIDDING IS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL TO COMBAT 
AGGRESSIVE LENDER STRATEGIES 
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding to require credit bidding, 
granting debtors and courts the choice to prohibit credit bidding would 
permit needed flexibility in a Chapter 11 proceeding. Even if judicial 
valuation can satisfy the indubitable equivalent standard, should courts 
 
150 Id. at 2073. 
151 Id. at 2070. 
152 Id. at 2073. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 2071 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)). 
155 Id. at 2072. The Supreme Court did not define the phrase “textual indications,” but the opinion 
suggests that the Court used this phrase to refer to an analysis of statutory context in order to shine light 
on statutory meaning. 
156 Id. at 2073. 
157 See id. at 2072. 
158 See id. at 2073. 
159 Id. 
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restrict credit bidding? The Supreme Court declined to discuss this policy, 
noting, “the pros and cons of credit-bidding are for the consideration of 
Congress, not the courts.”160 In so doing, the Supreme Court missed an 
opportunity to curtail an abusive bankruptcy practice that is currently 
stifling the rehabilitation of businesses.161 
To illustrate how credit bidding chills auctions and how opportunistic 
investors influence the bankruptcy process, we will revisit our earlier 
example of a $100 million loan secured by a $50 million apartment 
complex.162 Debtor hosts an auction sale of the apartment complex in order 
to pay back Creditor; however, Creditor has already sold its debt on the 
secondary market to Hedge Fund for $30 million. Hedge Fund desires to 
own and manage the apartment complex, believing that it will ultimately 
generate a profit from the enterprise. Debtor tries to recruit Bidder to enter 
the auction to bid for the apartment complex; however, Bidder knows from 
the early stages of his due diligence that Hedge Fund has a credit bid of 
$100 million and believes Hedge Fund desires to own the assets. Bidder is 
unwilling to spend additional money to investigate the potential apartment 
complex enterprise because Bidder assumes that he will be outbid by 
Hedge Fund’s credit bid. As a result, Bidder and many other potential 
bidders never enter the auction, making Hedge Fund likely to win with a 
credit bid. Since Hedge Fund’s bid establishes the “value” of the most 
senior lender’s claim (the loan it purchased for $30 million), all of the 
junior lenders and creditors will yield nothing from the sale. 
In recent bankruptcy auctions, lenders are using credit bidding as an 
offensive tool for strategic investors who wish to own the bankrupt entity 
with the goal of making a profit in the long term.163 These investors buy 
discounted debt on the secondary marketthey purchase debt from the 
original credit holders for less than the face value of the repayment 
obligationand credit bid up to the full value of the debt to purchase the 
assets of the company. Investors using such tactics take advantage of the 
current depression in asset value and bet on the upside potential of an 
entity.164 Giving debtors the choice to pursue judicial valuation can help to 
remedy this problem. 
 
160 Id. 
161 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive discussion of the arguments for 
credit bidding, see Buccola & Keller, supra note 1, at 117–22. 
162 See supra Part I.C. 
163 See Amy L. Kyle, Recent Trends in Asset Sales Under the Bankruptcy Code, in TRENDS IN 
COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 55, 58 (2010), available at 2010 WL 3650163, at *2. 
164 See id. 
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A. The In re Philadelphia Newspapers Auction 
Despite debtors’ continued insistence,165 courts have been somewhat 
unresponsive to the argument that credit bidding chills auctions. Judge 
Ambro famously wrote in In re Philadelphia Newspapers: “Although some 
may argue that credit bidding chills cash bidding, that argument 
underwhelms; credit bidding chills cash bidding no more than a deep-
pocketed cash bidder would chill less-well-capitalized cash bidders.”166 
While Judge Ambro may have been underwhelmed by the argument, the 
financial results of the In re Philadelphia Newspapers asset sale presented 
a unique case study of how credit bidding can, and did, chill an auction 
proceeding. 
The original In re Philadelphia Newspapers plan proposed to restrict 
credit bidding and conduct an all-cash auction. The bankruptcy court 
denied this plan.167 Based on the bankruptcy court’s ruling, the initial 
prospective bidders assumed credit bidding would be permitted at auction. 
There were seven total parties interested in bidding during this time.168 
After the district court reversed the bankruptcy court and confirmed 
the all-cash auction plan, the number of interested parties jumped to 
fourteen,169 and then rose again to twenty-nine in the weeks before the 
Third Circuit rendered its opinion affirming the district court.170 No longer 
faced with the threat of a $300 million credit bid, the market responded to 
an all-cash auction by showing a four-fold increase in the number of 
bidders.171 The original In re Philadelphia Newspapers lenders won the 
auction with a cash bid of $139 million.172 This equated to “thirty-three 
cents on the dollar,” a remarkable sum considering the senior debt was 
trading in the secondary market for “twenty cents on the dollar” for much 
of the duration of the bankruptcy case.173 
Restricting credit bidding in the In re Philadelphia Newspapers asset 
sale fostered a more active and more competitive auction environment, 
supporting the argument that a $300 million credit bid had dissuaded 
bidders. The all-cash auction caused more bidders to enter with more 
aggressive bids.174 The final auction price was higher than anticipated 
 
165 See Marshall, supra note 85; Winikka & Simpson, supra note 85. 
166 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 321 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
167 Id. at 301–02 (majority opinion). 
168 Lawrence G. McMichael et al., Quick Sales and Credit Bids (ABI 6th Annual Mid-Atlantic 
Bankruptcy Workshop, Aug. 5–7, 2010), WL 080510 ABI-CLE 285.  
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
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during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.175 Had a third party won the 
auction, the cash value received by the creditors would have likely 
supported a finding of indubitable equivalence.176 
B. Restricting Speculative Credit Bidding Promotes Effective Debtor 
Rehabilitation 
The recent economic downturn has fostered a Chapter 11 environment 
that is witnessing an increase in aggressive credit bidding strategies.177 The 
secondary market for secured debt is trading at highly discounted values,178 
and the purchasers of this debt believe they can influence the bankruptcy 
process to derive a profit from these claims.179 Additionally, the 
unavailability of capital is pushing many potential Chapter 11 
reorganizations to resolve themselves with fast asset sales under § 363 
followed by a liquidation plan.180 
As traditional lenders declined to provide financing to distressed 
entities, nontraditional lendersprimarily specialized hedge 
fundssupplied credit, purchasing discounted debt from larger lenders and 
providing debtor financing through the Chapter 11 reorganization.181 These 
nontraditional lenders are speculating on the future appreciation of the debt, 
either through a fast asset sale, or through the ownership, management, and 
subsequent sale of the reorganized entity.182 The ability to credit bid up to 
the full face value of a claim virtually assures the nontraditional lender will 
emerge as the owner of the reorganized entity.183 If the investor does not 
 
175 Id. 
176 See id. 
177 See Jonathan S. Covin & Brant C. Martin, Kicking the Can Down the Road: Understanding the 
Current State of Commercial Bankruptcy Trends and Strategies, in NAVIGATING RECENT BANKRUPTCY 
LAW TRENDS 75, 78–80 (2010), available at 2010 WL 4735522, at *4.  
178 David Line Batty, Necessity Is the Mother of Innovation During the Credit Crisis, 14 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 1, 14 (2010). 
179 Richard D. Thomas, Comment, Tipping the Scales in Chapter 11: How Distressed Debt 
Investors Decrease Debtor Leverage and the Efficacy of Business Reorganization, 27 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 213, 217–18 (2010) (discussing how distressed debt investors purchase debt positions in 
bankruptcy expecting to make a profit through the reorganization). 
180 See Covin & Martin, supra note 177, at 76–77. 
181 See David Peress & Thomas C. Prinzhorn, Nontraditional Lenders and the Impact of Loan-to-
Own Strategies on the Restructuring Process, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2006, at 48. 
182 See id. 
183 See Covin & Martin, supra note 177. Assets sold pursuant to a § 363 sale, or in accordance with 
a plan, are permitted under certain circumstances to be sold “free and clear” of liens, granting the 
investors clear title to the assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Additionally, 
when bankruptcy courts approve orders to sell all of the debtor’s assets they “frequently include 
provisions that protect the purchaser from any subsequent fraudulent transfer claims based on the theory 
that the purchaser bought the assets from the debtor for less than ‘reasonably equivalent value.’” Covin 
& Martin, supra note 177, at 78. 
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win the auction with a face-value bid, his lien will attach to the proceeds of 
the auction,184 granting him the value of the security’s rapid appreciation. 
The presence of these nontraditional lenders complicates a Chapter 11 
asset sale by shifting the incentives of the bidders at auction. When 
traditional lenders approach a bankruptcy auction, their goal is to recoup as 
much of their loan as possible.185 Nontraditional lenders, on the other hand, 
have the express goal of owning the assets after the reorganization, and will 
credit bid the full face value of their claima value in excess of the market 
value of the assets for an undersecured claimin order to secure their 
ownership interest.186 While a nontraditional lender may have to pay 
additional cash to the estate to satisfy a superior lien, administrative 
expenses, or both, the result of this reorganization typically leaves the 
subordinated and “unsecured creditors with little or no recovery.”187 
Nontraditional lenders employing these aggressive credit bidding 
techniques are betting on collateral appreciation—the upside potential. As 
noted in In re The Pacific Lumber Co., “[t]he Bankruptcy Code . . . does 
not protect a secured creditor’s upside potential; it protects the ‘allowed 
secured claim.’ If a creditor were over-secured, it could not demand to keep 
its collateral rather than be paid in full simply to protect the ‘upside 
potential.’”188 A judicial valuation of the debtor’s collateral would fix the 
asset price at the current market value—the “allowed amount” of secured 
claims.189 This valuation would provide the creditor with the indubitable 
equivalent of its claim, and a sale price in excess of this value would 
benefit the rest of the estate.190 This procedure would bring a sale of assets 
pursuant to a plan more in line with the Chapter 11 purpose of 
rehabilitation and reorganization. 
 
184 § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
185 See Peress & Prinzhorn, supra note 181. 
186 See Robert J. Keach et al., Resolved: Loan-to-Own DIP Lenders Should Not Be Allowed to 
Credit Bid (ABI 25th Annual Spring Meeting, Apr. 15–17, 2007), WL 041207 ABI-CLE 85; Kyle, 
supra note 163. 
187 See Keach, supra note 186. 
188 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 
584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009). 
189 § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). See also supra Part I.B (discussing the process of valuation). 
190 See § 1129(b)(2)(B) (dictating that the plan of reorganization must provide for the senior 
creditor to be paid in full to the allowed amount of its claim before a creditor with an interest junior to 
the dissenting senior creditor may receive anything under the plan). Fixing the allowed amount of a 
secured creditor’s claim via a judicial valuation would satisfy the requirement that a secured creditor be 
paid in full, permitting recovery for junior creditors of the estate. See In re The Pac. Lumber Co., 584 
F.3d at 238, 244, 248 (permitting a judicial valuation to determine the indubitable equivalent of a 
creditor’s claim). 
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IV. COURTS MAY USE THE INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENT STANDARD TO 
CRAM DOWN ASSET SALE PLANS THAT RESTRICT CREDIT BIDDING 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the cramdown provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code not only promotes improper policy, but also promotes 
inconsistency within the Code. Consistent interpretation between §§ 363 
(granting creditors adequate protection against collateral devaluation) 
and 1129(b) (ensuring creditors are properly compensated when a plan is 
crammed down against their will) suggests that the Supreme Court should 
have interpreted the cramdown provision to grant more flexibility in plan 
design. A proper interpretation of § 1129(b) would permit plans to restrict 
credit bidding in bankruptcy auctions so long as the creditors are paid the 
value of their claim as determined judicially.191 
Judge Ambro’s dissent in In re Philadelphia Newspapers and the 
Seventh Circuit in River Road stress that the interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute would be incomplete without referring to the provision’s legislative 
history;192 however, the Supreme Court did not conduct this analysis.193 The 
Senate Report addressing § 1129 confirms that the standard of indubitable 
equivalence is intended to follow the approach provided by Judge Hand’s 
opinion in In re Murel Holding Corp.194 Judge Hand stressed the flexibility 
granted to judges in crafting a solution under the indubitable equivalence 
subprovision.195 He noted that in the cramdown context, providing the 
secured creditor with the indubitable equivalent of his claim is not “a 
‘method’ at all; it merely gives power generally to the judge . . . to 
‘provide . . . adequate protection,’ when the other methods are not 
chosen.”196 The bankruptcy judge has the discretion to determine whether 
adequate protection is satisfied.197 
The floor debates remind us that the § 1129(b) list of factors that could 
satisfy the fair and equitable requirement of cramming down are 
nonexclusive, stressing that “[a]lthough many of the factors interpreting 
 
191 But see Jason S. Brookner, Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers: The Eradication of a 
Carefully Constructed Statutory Regime Through Misinterpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 127, 146–47 (2011) for an argument that paying a lender the 
judicial valuation of its collateral does not provide it with the indubitable equivalent of its claim. 
192 See River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 649–50, 652 n.8 (7th Cir. 
2011), aff’d sub nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012); In 
re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
193 RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2071–72 (applying only “the specific governs the general” and the 
antisuperfluity canons of statutory interpretation). 
194 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 127 (1978). 
195 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d 
Cir. 1935). See also supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text (discussing the two ways to calculate the 
value of collateral). 
196 In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d at 942. 
197 Id. 
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‘fair and equitable’ are specified in paragraph (2), others . . . were omitted 
from the House amendment to avoid statutory complexity.”198 They also 
dictate that a plan may be crammed down if any of the three subprovisions 
are satisfied, including the more general provision of indubitable 
equivalence.199 
Floor debates discussing § 1129 note that the sale provision of 
subsection (ii)—providing for a sale free and clear of liens subject to credit 
bidding—is “self explanatory.”200 In clarifying the indubitable equivalent 
standard of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), the floor debates note that “[a]bandonment 
of the collateral to the creditor” and “a lien on similar collateral” could 
qualify as the indubitable equivalent of the creditor’s claim.201 The 
legislative history does not restrict subsection (iii) to nonsale situations, nor 
does it explicitly permit it.202 In order to add additional clarity to the 
meaning of the statute, we must now look to the statutory context within 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
A. The Similarity Between §§ 361 and 1129(b) Strongly Suggests that 
They Should Be Interpreted Consistently 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in RadLAX, the circuit split 
hinged on the ambiguity (or lack thereof) of § 1129(b). Because the Third 
and Fifth Circuits determined that the statute is clear on its face, they held 
that the disjunctive “or” meant a plan may satisfy the indubitable 
equivalent prong regardless of how the plan is structured.203 The Seventh 
Circuit determined that the statute is ambiguous, and used legislative 
history, statutory context, and policy concerns to hold that a plan may 
satisfy the indubitable equivalent prong only if the plan is not structured in 
one of the other two ways provided by the statute.204 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, found “no textual ambiguity” 
within the statute.205 However, rather than looking only to the text of the 
“unambiguous” statute in order to discern its meaning, the Court reiterated 
that analyzing statutory context or other “textual indications” can add 
clarity to the meaning of a statute and overcome the canon of construction 
presuming the “specific governs the general.”206 The Supreme Court 
 





203 See supra notes 102–04, 118–21 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
205 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012), aff’g River 
Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011). 
206 Id. at 2071–72. 
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asserted that no textual indications were present in the Bankruptcy Code to 
justify a departure from this canon of construction.207 
Despite thorough contextual analyses, neither the Third, Fifth, or 
Seventh Circuits, nor the Supreme Court, analyzed § 1129(b) in 
conjunction with § 361, the section of the Bankruptcy Code that provides 
the means to grant a creditor adequate protection during the pendency of a 
bankruptcy proceeding.208 Even if courts assume § 1129 is ambiguous, 
consistent interpretation of § 1129(b) with § 361 requires courts to 
conclude that a plan may satisfy the indubitable equivalent prong of 
§ 1129(b) regardless of the plan’s structure. Due to their substantial 
similarity, analyzing § 1129 in conjunction with § 361 can add clarity to 
the meaning of § 1129. When discussing the interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Code, one judge noted: “Consistency in the meaning of 
language in a statute—and most certainly that of words of art—is not only 
a virtue, it is a hallmark of faithful statutory construction.”209 
Section 361 dictates alternate means of granting creditors adequate 
protection against devaluation of their collateral during a bankruptcy 
proceeding.210 The format, purpose, language, and history of § 361 are 
remarkably similar to § 1129, and should give clarity to Congress’s desired 
interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). Furthermore, due to the 
similarities between these sections, interpreting them differently promotes 
undesirable inconsistency within the Bankruptcy Code. 
Section 361 provides for three means by which a creditor can receive 
adequate protection. The section dictates: 
 When adequate protection is required[,] . . . such adequate protection may 
be provided by(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic 
cash payments to such entity, to the extent that [the Chapter 11 process] 
results in a decrease in the value of [the collateral]; (2) providing to such 
entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that [the Chapter 11 
process] results in a decrease in the value of [the collateral]; or (3) granting 
such other relief, . . . as will result in the realization by such entity of the 
indubitable equivalent of [the collateral].211 
 
207 Id. at 2072. 
208 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006). 
209 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 378 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
importance of consistent interpretation between types of proposals that can satisfy the standard of 
indubitable equivalence under §§ 361 and 1129), aff’d, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). Accord In re Hoff, 54 B.R. 
746, 753–54 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (comparing the standard of indubitable equivalence given in § 1129 
with the standard of indubitable equivalence in § 361 and concluding that the proposed method of 
reorganization did not satisfy the § 1129 indubitable equivalence standard because it did not satisfy the 
§ 361 indubitable equivalence standard). 
210 § 361. 
211 Id. 
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These options are consistent with the cramdown options provided in 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A). Both sections dictate that the subprovisions are 
nonexclusive.212 Sections 361(1) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) both permit a debtor 
to protect a creditor’s claim by making periodic cash payments to the 
creditor to compensate it for the full value of its claim.213 Section 361(2) 
highlights the debtor’s option of granting “an additional or replacement lien 
to the extent” the creditor’s collateral has depreciated in value.214 This 
§ 361 provision is analogous to the means of cramming down a plan 
suggested by the legislative history of § 1129(b), proposing that “a lien on 
similar collateral” would satisfy indubitable equivalence.215 
The legislative history surrounding § 361 notes that a court may 
provide adequate protection by “permitting a secured creditor to bid in his 
claim at the sale of the property and to offset the claim against the price bid 
in.”216 This method is nearly identical to § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), which 
provides for a sale of the debtors’ assets with a presumptive right to credit 
bid.217 Finally, both §§ 361 and 1129(b) include a catchall provision 
requiring the lenders to receive the “indubitable equivalent” of their interest 
in the entity’s property.218 This indubitable equivalent standard grants the 
bankruptcy court sufficient flexibility to confirm a reorganization plan or a 
method of providing adequate protection that precisely satisfies the 
circumstances of the case. 
In order to promote uniform interpretation of similar provisions 
throughout the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court should have 
interpreted § 1129’s cramdown provision consistently with precedential 
interpretation of the means of granting adequate protection in § 361. A 
review of § 361 interpretations reveals two important conclusions that 
should also apply to courts’ interpretation of § 1129: (1) the subprovisions 
are not exclusive and (2) what the debtor proposes to do does not govern 
the provision under which its plan must be confirmed. 
Courts frequently approve means of granting adequate protection that 
are not listed within the text of § 361, which shows that the subprovisions 
 
212 Id. (noting that “such adequate protection may be provided by” several mechanisms (emphasis 
added)); id. § 1129(b)(2) (“[T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class 
includes the following requirements . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
213 Id. § 361(1) (“[R]equiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such 
entity, to the extent that [the Chapter 11 process] results in a decrease in the value of [the 
collateral] . . . .”); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (dictating “that each holder of a claim . . . receive . . . 
deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective 
date of the plan, of at least the value of [the collateral]”). 
214 Id. § 361(2). 
215 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978). 
216 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977). 
217 § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
218 See id. § 361(3); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
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are not exclusive. The most common nonstatutory means of adequate 
protection is the existence of an equity cushion. An equity cushion exists 
when a creditor is oversecured.219 Since the purpose of providing adequate 
protection according to § 361 is to protect the creditor from a decline in the 
value of its collateral,220 if the collateral has a present value sufficiently in 
excess of the creditor’s claim, courts are willing to deem that creditor 
adequately protected.221 Courts can also find adequate protection through a 
combination of restrictions on the debtor’s use of cash collateral to operate 
the business, reporting requirements imposed upon the debtor,222 and third-
party guarantees.223 
In addition, courts regularly confirm plans that propose to combine 
methods of providing adequate protection.224 The acceptance of these plans 
shows that the debtor’s proposed method of granting adequate protection 
(what the plan provides) does not govern the provision of the section under 
which it must be confirmed.225 A proposal that uses a method listed in the 
statute combined with a method not listed in the statute does not make the 
proposal invalid; instead, courts analyze the proposal under the indubitable 
equivalent prong to determine whether it provides adequate protection.226 
Courts approve plans calling for periodic cash payments (permitted by 
§ 361(1)) in addition to replacement liens on property (provided for in 
§ 361(2)).227 Additionally, courts do not require the debtor to make periodic 
cash payments if an appointed trustee makes them instead.228 Combining an 
equity cushion with periodic cash payments is another popular 
 
219 2 BANKRUPTCY DESK GUIDE § 21:39 (2007). 
220 See, e.g., In re Mosello, 195 B.R. 277, 288 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting In re 495 Cent. 
Park Ave. Corp., 136 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)); Barclays Bank of N.Y. v. Saypol (In re 
Saypol), 31 B.R. 796, 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he legislative history confirms that adequate 
protection centers on protection of a secured creditor from suffering a decline in the value of the 
collateral during the bankruptcy proceeding.”). 
221 See, e.g., Bray v. Shenandoah Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n (In re Snowshoe Co.), 789 F.2d 1085, 
1088 (4th Cir. 1986); Pistole v. Mellor (In re Mellor), 734 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984); In re 
Norton, 347 B.R. 291, 298 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Avila, 311 B.R. 81, 83 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
2004); In re T.H.B. Corp., 85 B.R. 192, 194 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988). 
222 See, e.g., In re Inforex, Inc., 10 B.R. 497, 499–500 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1979). 
223 See, e.g., People’s United Bank v. Lombardo’s Ravioli Kitchen, Inc. (In re Lombardo’s Ravioli 
Kitchen, Inc.), No. 08-20774, 2009 WL 585814, at *4–5 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 20, 2009). 
224 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. San Felipe @ Voss, Ltd. (In re San Felipe @ Voss, Ltd.), 115 
B.R. 526, 527–28, 531 (S.D. Tex. 1990). 
225 See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2010). 
226 Corestates Bank v. United Chem. Techs., Inc., 202 B.R. 33, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
227 See, e.g., In re Selby Farms, Inc., 15 B.R. 372, 374 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1981). 
228 See, e.g., In re Beaver, 337 B.R. 281, 285 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (noting that “[t]he legislative 
history [of 11 U.S.C. § 361(3)] merely paraphrases the statute and does not suggest that Congress 
intended to limit a debtor’s adequate protection options”). 
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alternative.229 In analyzing plans proposing a mixture of methods, courts do 
not discuss whether the method proposed exactly conforms to the 
subprovisions of § 361 but, rather, focus on whether the debtor’s proposal 
provides the creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its claim. 
That treatment of § 361 runs contrary to how the Supreme Court and 
the Seventh Circuit in River Road, and Judge Ambro’s dissent in In re 
Philadelphia Newspapers, read the word provides in § 1129(b). They 
dictate that a plan should be crammed down according to the subprovision 
that is most similar to the plan’s proposed action.230 Like § 1129(b), § 361 
also uses the term “provides.” When a court determines adequate protection 
to be necessary, § 361 reads, “such adequate protection may be provided 
by”231 and then lists three options. This wording is essentially identical to 
§ 1129(b), which reads, “the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with 
respect to a class includes the following requirements: (A) With respect to 
a class of secured claims, the plan provides,” followed by the three 
cramdown subprovisions.232 Surely with Code provisions this similar, a 
mere difference in the tense of the verb “to provide” does not create a 
different statutory meaning. 
Until the decision of River Road, courts’ treatment of § 1129 mirrored 
their treatment of § 361. Plans of reorganization that proposed a 
combination of statutorily provided means and novel means were 
confirmed under the indubitable equivalent standard of 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).233 A common reorganization plan accepted under the 
indubitable equivalent standard of § 1129 proposes to completely abandon 
collateral to the creditor in satisfaction of its debt.234 A subset of this 
method is the “dirt for debt” plan that proposes to surrender a portion of the 
 
229 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Monnier (In re Monnier Bros.), 755 F.2d 1336, 1340 
(8th Cir. 1985). 
230 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012), aff’g River 
Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011); see also River Rd., 651 F.3d at 
652; In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 326–27 (Ambro, J., dissenting). Accord Brookner, supra note 
191, at 136–37. 
231 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006) (emphasis added). 
232 Id. § 1129(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
233 See, e.g., In re Atlanta S. Bus. Park, Ltd., 173 B.R. 444, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (“A plan 
that includes the partial return of collateral may be confirmable under certain circumstances. One 
circumstance occurs where, as here, the creditor is oversecured and the value of the surrendered 
collateral is equivalent to the amount of the creditor’s claim.”). See also In re May, 174 B.R. 832, 837 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (concluding that a proposal to surrender only a portion of collateral to an 
oversecured creditor in full satisfaction of its claim can provide such a creditor with the indubitable 
equivalent of its claim). 
234 See, e.g., Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. La. Nat’l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.), 881 F.2d 
1346, 1354 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Hardy Mach., No. 93-80633, 1994 WL 722084 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
Dec. 16, 1994). 
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debtor’s assets to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the creditor’s claim.235 
In another variation, the plan proposes to satisfy either all or a portion of 
the creditor’s claim with a lien on substitute collateral.236 
All of these plans require the court to judicially value both the initial 
collateral and the replacement collateral to ensure the creditor is receiving 
the indubitable equivalent of its claim. In certain circumstances, a court 
may subordinate a replacement lien if the value of the collateral securing 
the primary and secondary lien is sufficient to cover both claims.237 Courts 
are just as receptive to plans proposing a number of options; as one court 
has noted: “[T]here is no prohibition on a debtor using several methods to 
provide a secured creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its claim. 
Courts have routinely allowed combinations of cash payments, payments 
over time, abandonment of collateral, and substitution of collateral.”238 The 
Supreme Court’s decision changes this history, requiring a plan to conform 
to the subprovision to which it is most similar.239 This reduces the 
flexibility relied upon by bankruptcy courts to confirm nontraditional plans 
that offer creditors the indubitable equivalent of their claims. 
Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted 
consistently with § 361 to grant nonexclusive means of providing fair and 
equitable treatment to dissenting creditors. Historical treatment of both 
§§ 361 and 1129 shows routine use of nonstatutory means of providing 
adequate protection and fair and equitable treatment, echoing legislative 
history promoting the “not exclusive” nature of the sections.240 Debtors 
routinely propose plans that utilize a mixture of statutory means—either 
with nonstatutory or other statutory means—showing that what the plan 
proposes to do does not govern the provision under which it must be 
confirmed. 
Additionally, consistent interpretation of the statute demands more 
than granting like terms the same meaning in different parts of the statute—
 
235 See, e.g., Arnold & Baker Farms v. United States (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 85 F.3d 1415, 
1423–24 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that a partial distribution of collateral could satisfy the indubitable 
equivalent standard even though the particular plan before the court did not); In re Bannerman 
Holdings, LLC, No. 10-01053-SWH, 2010 WL 4260003, at *1, *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2010); In 
re May, 174 B.R. at 840. 
236 See, e.g., Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc. (In re Sun Country Dev., Inc.), 764 F.2d 406, 408–09 
(5th Cir. 1985). 
237 See, e.g., Woods v. Pine Mountain, Ltd. (In re Pine Mountain, Ltd.), 80 B.R. 171, 174–75 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987). 
238 In re Bryant, 439 B.R. 724, 747 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010); see also id. (assessing the debtor’s 
plan to (1) make a partial lump-sum payment, (2) abandon certain collateral, and (3) provide cash 
payments over time to satisfy the remainder of the claim). 
239 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012), aff’g River 
Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011). 
240 See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text. 
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one must also interpret the substance of the provisions consistently. Section 
361 ensures that creditors are treated fairly and their rights to the value of 
their collateral are respected. It provides specific examples of ways to 
ensure creditors are treated fairly, but also permits courts to use their own 
discretion to craft equitable remedies. The primary focus of § 1129(b) is to 
provide a means to confirm a plan of reorganization despite the objection 
of creditors; however, § 1129 ensures that we protect the interests of these 
creditors and only confirm plans that are fair. As the primary concern of 
§ 361 is fairness to creditors, courts should look to § 361 to help illuminate 
the fairness of the plans under § 1129. 
Consistent interpretation of §§ 361 and 1129(b) strongly supports the 
conclusion that a plan proposing to sell a creditor’s collateral free and clear 
of liens without permitting credit bidding may be confirmed under the 
indubitable equivalent prong as long as the plan provides the creditors with 
the indubitable equivalent of their claims. While both In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers and In re The Pacific Lumber Co. reached this conclusion, 
only In re The Pacific Lumber Co. took the necessary step of evaluating the 
proposed plan to confirm that it satisfied the standard of indubitable 
equivalence.241 The Supreme Court argues that “[a]s a matter of law, no bid 
procedures like the ones proposed [in the RadLAX plan] could satisfy the 
requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A).”242 By making this assertion, the Supreme 
Court unnecessarily restricts valuation during a sale to valuation by auction 
with credit bidding, when the Bankruptcy Code clearly also permits judicial 
valuation.243 The bankruptcy court should retain the discretion to permit 
either valuation by auction or judicial valuation. With judicial valuation, 
not only can the bid procedures provide for the indubitable equivalent of a 
claim, they may offer a far better approximation of the current market 
value. 
B. A Judicially Valued Asset Sale Plan Satisfies Indubitable Equivalence 
The indubitable equivalent provision can apply to plans proposing to 
sell assets at auction without credit bidding; however, just because it is 
permitted to apply does not mean the proposed plan will satisfy the high 
standards of indubitable equivalence. Courts must be stringent in their 
analysis of the creditor’s return under the proposed plan to ensure that it 
provides the indubitable equivalent of the creditor’s claim. Rather than 
remanding for a factual determination, RadLAX concluded as a matter of 
 
241 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 
584 F.3d 229, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2009). 
242 RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2073. 
243 See supra notes 60–62. 
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law that the indubitable equivalent standard could not be met.244 Had the 
Court continued to a factual analysis, it would have concluded that a plan 
providing for the sale of a debtor’s assets without credit bidding does not 
fail to satisfy § 1129(b)(2)(A) as a matter of law, but rather can satisfy the 
indubitable equivalent standard if the court equitably determines the value 
of the secured creditor’s claim. 
As discussed earlier, the Bankruptcy Code recognizes two equally 
valid means of determining the value of a creditor’s claim: via a judicial 
proceeding245 or by selling the collateral at a public auction.246 A judicial 
determination of value, codified in § 506(a),247 provides the means for both 
the debtor and the creditor to present evidence of the collateral’s appraised 
value.248 Courts recognize that this is often an “inexact science”;249 
however, it may be the best alternative given the purpose of the valuation 
and the goals of the particular bankruptcy reorganization. The Supreme 
Court in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash blessed the use of a judicial 
valuation for cramdown plans and determined that the replacement value 
standard is the appropriate valuation to use.250 
In order for a court to determine if the objecting creditor is receiving 
the indubitable equivalent of its claim, the court must first value the 
collateral. If the proposed plan limits valuation by auction subject to credit 
bidding, the court must value the collateral by the only other option 
recognized by the Bankruptcy Code: judicially. Thus, a plan proposing to 
sell the debtor’s assets free and clear of liens while restricting credit 
bidding without cause can only satisfy the standard of indubitable 
equivalence if the court first values the claim judicially. RadLAX fails to 
 
244 In contrast, In re The Pacific Lumber Co. completed both parts of the analysis by first 
determining whether the indubitable equivalent prong was permitted to apply, and then determining 
whether the creditor received the indubitable equivalence of its claim. See 584 F.3d at 244–47. 
245 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006) (“Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the 
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing 
on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.”). 
246 Id. § 363(b), (k); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii); Takisaki v. Alpine Grp., Inc. (In re Alpine Grp., Inc.), 
151 B.R. 931, 935 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (“The offered price . . . is conclusive evidence of the 
property’s value.”). 
247 § 506(a); River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 2011), 
aff’d sub nom. RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. 2065. See also supra Part I.B (discussing the process of valuation). 
248 3 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 361.04, at 361-22 to -23. 
249 Gennrich v. Mont. Sport U.S.A., Ltd. (In re Int’l Ski Serv., Inc.), 119 B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wis. 1990) (citing Gen. Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re Gen. Indus., Inc.), 79 B.R. 124, 135 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1987)). See also Boyle v. Wells (In re Gustav Schaefer Co.), 103 F.2d 237, 242 (6th Cir. 1939) 
(“The valuation of property is an inexact science and whatever method is used will be only an 
approximation . . . .). 
250 520 U.S. 953, 960 (1997) (describing the replacement value standard as “the price a willing 
buyer in the debtor’s trade, business, or situation would pay to obtain like property from a willing 
seller”). 
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discuss judicial valuation at all. River Road discusses judicial valuation as 
an alternative to valuation by auction, but does not discuss why it restricts 
judicial valuation when assets are to be sold.251 In re The Pacific Lumber 
Co. correctly recognized these options, concluding that the judicial 
valuation was not erroneous and that the stringent indubitable equivalent 
standard was met.252 
CONCLUSION 
Congress, in response to the RadLAX decision, should amend the 
Bankruptcy Code to permit judicial valuation of claims to combat 
aggressive lending strategies and promote the rehabilitation of businesses. 
The debate surrounding § 1129(b) has occurred during a time of elevated 
Chapter 11 filings with significantly undersecured creditors.253 Granting 
debtors the choice to restrict credit bidding will offer them essential 
flexibility to restructure their entities. Rather than host an asset sale in 
which potential bidders will likely be dissuaded by a nontraditional lender 
holding a credit bid far in excess of the current market value of the assets, 
debtors will be able to fix the collateral valuation judicially. Any bids 
received in excess of the judicial valuation will benefit the subordinated 
creditors and equity holders within the estate.254 Additionally, as the In re 
Philadelphia Newspapers auction shows us, increased bidder attendance 
brought on by a restriction on credit bidding will foster a more competitive 
auction environment, likely resulting in a higher asset sale price. 
The Supreme Court should have followed the approach taken by In re 
The Pacific Lumber Co. and permitted debtors to choose whether to 
prohibit credit bidding at an auction sale.255 Due to their similarity in text 
and purpose, the Court should have analyzed § 1129(b) in conjunction with 
§ 361 in a way that reflects uniform interpretation.256 Because § 361 does 
not impose a functional plan classification (i.e., what the plan provides 
does not govern under which subprovision it must be confirmed), § 1129(b) 
 
251 River Rd., 651 F.3d at 650. 
252 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 
584 F.3d 229, 247–49 (5th Cir. 2009). 
253 See Covin & Martin, supra note 177, at 76. 
254 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2006) (dictating that the plan of reorganization must provide for 
the senior creditor to be paid in full to the allowed amount of its claim before a creditor with an interest 
junior to the dissenting senior creditor may receive anything under the plan). Fixing the allowed amount 
of a secured creditor’s claim via a judicial valuation would satisfy the requirement that a secured 
creditor be paid in full, permitting recovery for junior creditors of the estate. See In re The Pac. Lumber 
Co., 584 F.3d at 238, 244, 248 (permitting a judicial valuation to determine the indubitable equivalent 
of a creditor’s claim). 
255 In re The Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 247. 
256 See § 1129(b) (dictating the means to cram down a plan against a dissenting class of creditors); 
id. § 361 (dictating the means to provide adequate protection to creditors). 
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should also not impose such a functional classification. Instead, § 1129(b) 
should apply in a consistent manner with § 361, permitting a plan to be 
confirmed under the indubitable equivalent prong even if it has 
characteristics that are similar to other subprovisions. 
Asset sale plans that restrict credit bidding can satisfy the indubitable 
equivalent standard if the creditors are paid the judicially determined value 
of their collateral. The Bankruptcy Code permits valuation to occur either 
judicially or via an auction sale, subject to the ability to credit bid.257 If 
credit bidding is restricted at auction, judicial valuation provides an 
alternative that will assure that the creditors are receiving the indubitable 
equivalent of their claim.258 
When addressing this circuit split, the Supreme Court should have 
ensured an internally consistent interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, and 
also an interpretation that promotes the purpose of Chapter 11. The 
Bankruptcy Code does not protect a creditor’s upside potential; however, 
nontraditional lenders are using credit bidding as a tool to accomplish just 
that.259 The Supreme Court in RadLAX affirmed a practice that protects the 
investments of creditors at the expense of a reorganizing entity. In response 
to this, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code so that the cramdown 




257 Id. § 363(b), (k); id. § 506(a)(1) (“Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the 
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing 
on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.”); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii); 
Takisaki v. Alpine Grp., Inc. (In re Alpine Grp., Inc.), 151 B.R. 931, 935 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (“The 
offered price . . . is conclusive evidence of the property’s value.”). 
258 Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 960 (1997) (blessing the use of a judicial 
valuation for cramdown plans). 
259 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re The Pac. 
Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 247). 
